Situation Report In Nigeria

Situation Report Nigeria is divided, and religion is one aspect of that, but in a culture saturated by religiosity grievances are often understood through a religious and moral lens, writes John Campbell of the Council on Foreign Relations Religious conflict in Nigeria is only one element in a polity divided by ethnicity, characterised by weak government with little regard for the rule of law, and a culture saturated with religiosity. Religious conflict is both a symptom and a driver of the current Nigerian national crisis. National identity is underdeveloped and probably declining. Nigeria was cobbled together into a single political unit by the British only in 1914 and for matters of administrative convenience. That decision united people and territories with little in common. There was no uniform colonial administration across all territories and ethnic groups, no unifying struggle for independence, and there are no national heroes. Since independence in 1960, political life has been based on geographic regions and ethnic loyalties rather than on the nation as a whole. Family, ethnicity, religious, and regional identities supersede loyalty to the nation. Whether under military or civilian government, competing and cooperating elites have run the country for their own benefit, with little reference to the Nigerian people. For most of the country's post-independence history, Nigeria has been ruled by the military; ostensibly civilian government was restored in 1999. In style, content, and in the isolation of government from its people, there has been remarkable continuity between military and civilian governance. Religious Change Nigeria's religious landscape changed dramatically in the twentieth century. In 1900, it is estimated that the territory that makes up Nigeria was 27 percent Muslim and 2 percent Christian. The rest of the population adhered to traditional religions. Islam has been practiced in what is now Nigeria for a millennium, and Muslims regard the Sahel, of which Northern Nigeria is a part, as a core component of the Islamic world. During the twentieth century, and especially after independence, Christianity grew explosively in the South and the Middle Belt, and there are Christian minorities now in the predominantly Muslim North, mostly the consequence of internal migration. Nigerians often say they live in the "world's most religious country" Nigerian Christians commonly believe they are now the majority religion, and many Muslims fear that they are right. Some Christian leaders resort to triumphalist rhetoric that unsettles Muslims, who by almost all social and economic indices are much poorer and less developed than their Christian compatriots. The country is probably currently evenly divided between the two world religions. The geographic fault line between the two world religions is similar to that in Ghana and Côte D'Ivoire, running from east to west across the middle of the country—the Middle Belt. Meanwhile, indigenous African religions have to some extent faded from view. Many Muslims and Christians continue such traditional practices as the use of spells and charms, or belief in witchcraft and curses. Faith in Nigeria matters, profoundly. Nigerians like to say that they live in the "world's most religious country." Yet religious institutions are often as corrupt as any other, and some religious leaders are spectacularly rich. Both religions are in the midst of revival. Among Christians, revival often takes "Pentecostal" forms, while among Muslims it is often "Salafi." (Technical religious terms – such as "Salafi," "Sunni," "Sufi," or "Pentecostal" – usually have specific meanings in the Nigerian context that are related to, but differ in nuance, from standard use elsewhere.) Both religious approaches are literalist with respect to sacred texts; both tend to set fixed boundaries between "believers" and "non-believers." And their respective clergy are often authoritarian and judgemental. Religion and Government During the long periods of military government in post-independence Nigeria, religious conflict was noticeably less intense than it has become under civilian administrations. The military eschewed religious and ethnic identities, while civilian politics often involve appeals to ethnic and religious identities to build political coalitions and electoral support. To serve as a brake on ethnic, regional, and religious divisions, at the end of military rule in 1998, the competing and cooperating elites working within the ruling People's Democratic Party, established a pattern of presidential power alternation between the predominantly Muslim North and the mostly Christian South. That system was dismantled in 2011. Southern Christian Goodluck Jonathan successfully won the presidential campaign for re-election when many considered it to be a Northern Muslim's turn in the Presidential Villa. Jonathan's failure to replace the alternation system with a new balancing structure during a period of accelerating political appeals to ethnic and religious identities has been an important catalyst for the current wave of ostensibly "religious" conflicts in the northern half of the country. Islamist revolt in the north a direct threat to Muslim establishment Though usually in the background, "traditionalist" religions may sometimes violently assert themselves. In parts of the South, their adherents are occasionally credibly accused of human sacrifice. [1] In the Middle Belt, a group called "Ombatse"—the word means "our time has come" in the Eggon language—seeks to expel both Islam and Christianity and win political power for the Eggon ethnic group. In a 2013 incident, they killed over one hundred police, [2] and in another they displaced some 50,000 people by burning down their villages. [3] In some time periods, victims of "Ombatse's" violence outnumber those of radical Islamist jihadis. Conflict in Nigeria's oil patch, the Niger Delta, is ongoing. That is a conflict over the allocation of resources and lacks a significant religious dimension, though certain warlords have begun to use anti-Muslim rhetoric in their threats, particularly with reference to the presidential election. The population is almost entirely, at least nominally, Christian. Ethnic and religious conflict in the Middle Belt and "traditionalist" violence does not pose a threat to the Nigerian state, though the Jonathan administration's inability to control it undermines governmental credibility. By contrast, the radical Islamist revolt in the north, commonly called Boko Haram, is a direct threat to the traditional Islamic establishment led by the Sultan of Sokoto and the Shehu of Borno, and to the credibility of the Jonathan government. Boko Haram has tried to murder the Sultan and the Shehu; it also claimed responsibility for killing the Shehu's brother and bodyguards of the Sultan. 1. http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/country/canada_coi/nigeria/N... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 2. http://sunnewsonline.com/new/cover/ombatse-massacr... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 3. http://allafrica.com/stories/2013... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] Religion and Identity Religious conflict is most overt in the Middle Belt, where the religious and ethnic boundaries coincide with disputes over land and water use. Is a victim murdered because he is Hausa, Muslim, or a cattle herder? Or because he is all three? A result has been "ethnic cleansing" reminiscent of the Balkans in the area around the Plateau state capital of Jos in which the Christian and Muslim populations are now segregated. The government in Abuja, the media, and outside observers often label the region's conflicts as "religious," when in fact they are rooted in rivalries over land and water use. Unscrupulous local political figures also sometimes stir-up religious issues to advance a particular agenda. The national and state governments are too weak to suppress the conflicts or to address their underlying causes. Within Nigeria's federal system, not all Nigerians are equal. Nigerian law differentiates between "indigenes" and "settlers." The former, ostensibly "indigenous" to a particular area, enjoy a variety of privileges. "Settlers" come from somewhere else, even if generations ago, as is often the case. They may face social and economic restrictions. It is difficult to overcome "settler" status. In the Middle Belt, "indigenes" tend to be Christian, Barome farmers, while "settlers" are often Muslim, Hausa cattle herders. The "settler" population is perceived to be the more dynamic. It resents its "settler" status, while "indigenes" often feel threatened by "settler" dynamism. The state government is dominated by "indigenes." Religious and ethnic conflict in the Middle Belt is relatively diffuse and disorganised, though the numbers killed can be very high. The government has arrested, prosecuted, tried, convicted, and punished only an insignificant number of perpetrators. In the Middle Belt and elsewhere, ethnic and religious violence in effect has no government-imposed penalty. But, none of these parties seek the destruction of the Nigerian state. Islamic Revival Religious conflict in the North differs in that it is associated with a particular radical Islamic movement called Boko Haram. In the North, Boko Haram (and other, similar organisations) seeks to overthrow the Nigerian state and establish a pure Islamic state organised according to Islamic religious law, called sharia. In the North, there is a multifaceted Islamic revival underway, incorporating elements from Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and Pakistan, as well as Iran. The context is increasing poverty and a general perception of the political marginalisation of the North within the Nigerian federation. The twelve northern states have extended sharia to the criminal domain, but there is widespread dissatisfaction that its harsh penalties apply to the poor man stealing food while the rich man who steals millions through manipulation of government contracts gets off free. A theme of the reformers (non-violent as well as violent) is justice for the poor. General trepidation over encroaching Christianity is widespread in the North. Radical Islamists look to expel the Christian population that is often from other parts of Nigeria. In general, traditional society, not just radical jihadis, discriminates against Christians, and the few Fulani converts to Christianity may be murdered, often by members of their own families. Religious conflict frequently takes the form of a civil war within Islam. Radical reformers, in what is now Nigeria, have long claimed that Muslim leaders are "non-Muslim" if they are "unjust," even when the rulers claim to be Muslims themselves. Hence, "Salafi" reformers pit themselves against "Sufis" who dominate the traditional Nigerian Muslim elites. Some "Salafi" reformers wish to establish a pure Islamic state characterised by the strict application of Sharia. This has potent appeal in a period of increasing personal and communal poverty at the grassroots, while the traditional elites prosper from connections with the federal government and its oil revenue. In the North, there is also an important ethnic dimension. The Fulani ethnic group (in the west) and Kanuri (in the east) both identify themselves as "Sunni" if pushed to apply an internationally understood label. But, Boko Haram is associated more closely with the Kanuri in the northeast. The government and the media usually labels radical jihadis in Fulani areas as Boko Haram, even if they have few direct links with its leader, Abubakar Shekau. As a practical matter, the distinction between "Sunni" and "Shia," so important in other parts of the Muslim world, in Nigeria is largely that the former receive assistance from Saudi Arabia while the latter from Iran. There is, indeed, a small Shia community in the proper sense of the word in Nigeria; the traditional Islamic establishment is hostile to it. An aspect of the Islamist revival has been a rejection of working within the established structures of the secular state. Often charismatic imams (Muslim scholars) or malams (Muslim teachers) organise communities that withdraw as much as possible from secular life. Usually, such groups are quietist, even pacifists. However, at times they can turn violent, usually in response to the secular state's heavy handedness. The emergence of Boko Haram follows this pattern. Key Players and Groups: Boko Haram Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic malam, organised his community at the railroad mosque in Maiduguri around 2003. It sought to establish God's kingdom on earth through the rigid application of sharia and by isolating itself from the secular world. From its inception, the group was hostile to the secular Nigerian state and rejected Western education as non-Islamic. The name they apply to themselves in English means, "the Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad." The more widely known name "Boko Haram" is a label first used by the government and media and comes from their rejection of western education. However, the group was generally non-violent, though not pacifist, until 2009. That year, there was a series of altercations over local issues likely manipulated by local politicians that resulted in Yusuf launching an insurrection against the state. During its suppression, police murdered Yusuf. [4] The crime was captured on film and went viral on social media platforms. Several hundred of his followers were also extra-judicially killed, and the movement went underground, only to re-emerge in 2010 under a new leader, Yusuf's deputy, Abubakar Shekau. Most of Boko Haram's several thousand victims have been Muslims No longer peaceful after Yusuf's death, Boko Haram looked to overthrow through violence the secular Nigerian state and its compromised Islamic establishment. Shekau has called for the replacement of the Sultan of Sokoto–the premier Islamic political and religious leader–by a council dominated by Boko Haram and situated not in Sokoto state but in Yobe state. Illustrating the interplay between religion and ethnicity, Sokoto is Hausa-Fulani in population, while Yobe is Kanuri and traditionally under the authority of the Shehu of Borno, whose authority Boko Haram also rejects. Boko Haram also seeks the expulsion of Christians from the North. However, while it has killed Christians, most of its several thousand victims have been Muslims. The government's response to Boko Haram is to see it as a terrorist movement without popular roots and has reacted with severe repression. The government's seemingly indiscriminate killing of Boko Haram members, and many others simply in the wrong place at the wrong time [5] appears to be a driver of popular support or acquiescence for Boko Haram. During some periods of particularly brutal security force repression, they may be responsible for as many Nigerian deaths as Boko Haram. [6] The government and the media misleadingly attach the label "Boko Haram" to almost any Islamist episode of violence in the north – whether or not it was carried out under the orders from Shekau. "Boko Haram" is a highly diffuse and decentralised grass-roots revolt against the Nigerian political economy. Shekau's Boko Haram makes up only a part. The size of Shekau's Boko Haram is unknown. However, it has mounted operations involving at least five hundred operatives, implying several thousand members and affiliates. In addition, much larger numbers appear to acquiesce to what Boko Haram is doing, even if they do not support its violent methods. A credible hypothesis is that it draws many of its activists from the ranks of former students at the Almijiri schools, decentralised institutions usually without government support, where malams instruct their students to memorise the Qur'an – but teach nothing else. The pool of such students is estimated to number between 10 and 12 million. [7] Others are former prisoners, converted to radical Islam in prison and released through Boko Haram jail breaks. Others still are members of families already in Boko Haram. Very high levels of youth unemployment – estimated at more than fifty percent [8] – also provide a ready pool of recruits. And some operatives have been criminals hired by Boko Haram to participate in specific operations. 4. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2009/07/2009730... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 5. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria1012webw... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 6. http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nige... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 7. http://allafrica.com/stories/2013... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 8. http://allafrica.com/stories/2013... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] Key Players and Groups: Ansaru Ansaru is a smaller radical group with a base in Kano and Kaduna, rather than in Borno or Yobe. Its full name in English means "Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa." Its leadership is obscure; Abu Usama al Answari is frequently identified as its leader but little other than his name is known. Its spokesmen claim the group split from Boko Haram because of the latter's frequent killing of Muslims. Ansaru avoids Muslim casualties and actively attacks Christian churches. It appears to try to provoke a Christian backlash against Muslim minorities in the south, presumably to promote the break-up of the Nigerian state. Thus far, that effort has been unsuccessful. Ansaru has introduced into northern Nigeria tactics more commonly associated with the Sahel, especially kidnapping for ransom and, possibly, the use of suicide bombers, which were previously unknown in West Africa. It is also involved with trans-Saharan smuggling. The group has links with radical Islamist groups in Algeria and Mali, but it is unlikely that it takes direction from them. However, its fighters include some from outside Nigeria, especially Chad and Niger. There is some evidence of tactical cooperation between Ansaru and Boko Haram, and it is possible that they will re-unite. Boko Haram and Ansaru glorify violence. In one of his videos Shekau says, "I enjoy killing anyone that God commands me to kill." [9] Both are bitterly opposed to democracy. Shekau has said, "I swear by Allah that there will be no democracy in Nigeria. We are going to rise against it and we shall soon defeat it. The concept of government of the people, by the people, for the people cannot continue to exist. It shall soon, very soon, be replaced by government of Allah, by Allah, for Allah." [10] President Jonathan has claimed they also destroy symbols of state authority, such as the national flag. [11] Elsewhere in the North are other groups about which outsiders – including the Nigerian government – appear to know little. Their grievances and the focus of their violence are usually local, though they will use the Islamist rhetoric associated with Shekau. Presumably, many of them have a criminal or a political dimension –or both– as opposed to purely religious motivation. 9. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/w... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 10. http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/shekau-appears-in-a-v... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 11. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/05/read-full-text-of-jonat... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] Wider Aspects of the Conflict Funding for Boko Haram and other radical groups comes from bank robberies, kidnap ransoms, theft of weapons from government armouries, and, especially in the case of criminal groups, from smuggling, including narcotics. Remittances from overseas appear to play no role. None of the groups has moved to set up an alternative state structure, nor do they levy taxes on the local people. It should be noted that terrorism in northern Nigeria is cheap. Explosives – and knowledge about them – are widespread, not least because of the presence of an indigenous mining industry. Automobiles, used for suicide attacks and car bombs, are usually stolen. The large number of weapons in radical hands that come from government armouries implies that radical Islamic groups have infiltrated the military and other institutions of government. Senior military officials and even President Jonathan have affirmed this. Religion in Local Contexts Especially in the North, religious language is commonly used to express grievances which do not necessarily have a religious foundation, but are nonetheless understood through a religious and moral lens. Hence the use of religious vocabulary is an important dimension of conflict that may have a variety of roots. Professor Andrew Kakabase at the UK's Cranford School of Management observes that "in Nigeria, the Christian-Muslim thing is the tip of the iceberg. What's underneath the water is a much more complex sociopolitical situation, which cannot be explained just in terms of the religious divide. You have a recipe ripe for conflict, and it just so happens to be Christian-Muslim." Grievances are commonly seen through a religious and moral lens Throughout Nigeria – not just in the Middle Belt and the North –there is widespread popular anger against those who benefit from the current oil-based political economy. [12] The people are poor – and getting poorer. Yet the country has high rates of economic growth, making the rich richer. The spiritual saturates all aspects of public and private life. Material protests are framed in a spiritual and moral rhetoric, and religious tenets are the foundation for the ideal society. Moreover, the cooperating and competing elites, who have run Nigeria since independence, usurp these deeply embedded religious sentiments for their own purposes. Individuals and groups protesting against those elites equally draw on religious language and sentiments to frame their own rejections of the status quo, and to promote their own vision of Nigeria's future. Hence, in a highly significant way, religion shapes the way Nigerians define the good life – and protest a system that by and large denies it to them. It also provides justification for the use of violence – often murderous – against adversaries who are also defined in religious terms. Hence, Muslims and Christians will kill each other, and Muslims will kill other Muslims, and radical Muslims will murder representatives of the secular government in Abuja—all in the name of establishing God's kingdom on earth and justice for the poor. 12. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/opinion/nigerian-an... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] Porous Borders Northern Nigeria's borders are highly porous and essentially artificial – they were determined by the British and French governments without reference to the local people. Hence people of the same ethnicity and sometimes even the same community live on opposite sides of the border. Islamic movements tend to start in the east, especially Khartoum, and sweep west to Senegal, with national borders being fundamentally disregarded. In this environment, not only is the nation state weak, it is remarkably irrelevant to most people. Nevertheless, jihadist violence in northern Nigeria is overwhelmingly local in its causes and its focus. It is driven by bad governance, failure to promote economic development and the often brutal behavior of the Nigerian security services, especially the military. The West The American and British governments designated Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist organisations in 2013. The U.S. Treasury placed a reward for information on the location of Shekau and a few other radical leaders. The Abuja government seeks to involve Washington and London in its anti-terrorist campaign against Boko Haram. Boko Haram, in turn is using increasingly hostile rhetoric toward the West, especially the United States. Summary • Situation Report • Hide footnotes Author John Campbell Council on Foreign Relations, Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies