Situation Report In Nigeria

Situation Report Nigeria is divided, and religion is one aspect of that, but in a culture saturated by religiosity grievances are often understood through a religious and moral lens, writes John Campbell of the Council on Foreign Relations Religious conflict in Nigeria is only one element in a polity divided by ethnicity, characterised by weak government with little regard for the rule of law, and a culture saturated with religiosity. Religious conflict is both a symptom and a driver of the current Nigerian national crisis. National identity is underdeveloped and probably declining. Nigeria was cobbled together into a single political unit by the British only in 1914 and for matters of administrative convenience. That decision united people and territories with little in common. There was no uniform colonial administration across all territories and ethnic groups, no unifying struggle for independence, and there are no national heroes. Since independence in 1960, political life has been based on geographic regions and ethnic loyalties rather than on the nation as a whole. Family, ethnicity, religious, and regional identities supersede loyalty to the nation. Whether under military or civilian government, competing and cooperating elites have run the country for their own benefit, with little reference to the Nigerian people. For most of the country's post-independence history, Nigeria has been ruled by the military; ostensibly civilian government was restored in 1999. In style, content, and in the isolation of government from its people, there has been remarkable continuity between military and civilian governance. Religious Change Nigeria's religious landscape changed dramatically in the twentieth century. In 1900, it is estimated that the territory that makes up Nigeria was 27 percent Muslim and 2 percent Christian. The rest of the population adhered to traditional religions. Islam has been practiced in what is now Nigeria for a millennium, and Muslims regard the Sahel, of which Northern Nigeria is a part, as a core component of the Islamic world. During the twentieth century, and especially after independence, Christianity grew explosively in the South and the Middle Belt, and there are Christian minorities now in the predominantly Muslim North, mostly the consequence of internal migration. Nigerians often say they live in the "world's most religious country" Nigerian Christians commonly believe they are now the majority religion, and many Muslims fear that they are right. Some Christian leaders resort to triumphalist rhetoric that unsettles Muslims, who by almost all social and economic indices are much poorer and less developed than their Christian compatriots. The country is probably currently evenly divided between the two world religions. The geographic fault line between the two world religions is similar to that in Ghana and Côte D'Ivoire, running from east to west across the middle of the country—the Middle Belt. Meanwhile, indigenous African religions have to some extent faded from view. Many Muslims and Christians continue such traditional practices as the use of spells and charms, or belief in witchcraft and curses. Faith in Nigeria matters, profoundly. Nigerians like to say that they live in the "world's most religious country." Yet religious institutions are often as corrupt as any other, and some religious leaders are spectacularly rich. Both religions are in the midst of revival. Among Christians, revival often takes "Pentecostal" forms, while among Muslims it is often "Salafi." (Technical religious terms – such as "Salafi," "Sunni," "Sufi," or "Pentecostal" – usually have specific meanings in the Nigerian context that are related to, but differ in nuance, from standard use elsewhere.) Both religious approaches are literalist with respect to sacred texts; both tend to set fixed boundaries between "believers" and "non-believers." And their respective clergy are often authoritarian and judgemental. Religion and Government During the long periods of military government in post-independence Nigeria, religious conflict was noticeably less intense than it has become under civilian administrations. The military eschewed religious and ethnic identities, while civilian politics often involve appeals to ethnic and religious identities to build political coalitions and electoral support. To serve as a brake on ethnic, regional, and religious divisions, at the end of military rule in 1998, the competing and cooperating elites working within the ruling People's Democratic Party, established a pattern of presidential power alternation between the predominantly Muslim North and the mostly Christian South. That system was dismantled in 2011. Southern Christian Goodluck Jonathan successfully won the presidential campaign for re-election when many considered it to be a Northern Muslim's turn in the Presidential Villa. Jonathan's failure to replace the alternation system with a new balancing structure during a period of accelerating political appeals to ethnic and religious identities has been an important catalyst for the current wave of ostensibly "religious" conflicts in the northern half of the country. Islamist revolt in the north a direct threat to Muslim establishment Though usually in the background, "traditionalist" religions may sometimes violently assert themselves. In parts of the South, their adherents are occasionally credibly accused of human sacrifice. [1] In the Middle Belt, a group called "Ombatse"—the word means "our time has come" in the Eggon language—seeks to expel both Islam and Christianity and win political power for the Eggon ethnic group. In a 2013 incident, they killed over one hundred police, [2] and in another they displaced some 50,000 people by burning down their villages. [3] In some time periods, victims of "Ombatse's" violence outnumber those of radical Islamist jihadis. Conflict in Nigeria's oil patch, the Niger Delta, is ongoing. That is a conflict over the allocation of resources and lacks a significant religious dimension, though certain warlords have begun to use anti-Muslim rhetoric in their threats, particularly with reference to the presidential election. The population is almost entirely, at least nominally, Christian. Ethnic and religious conflict in the Middle Belt and "traditionalist" violence does not pose a threat to the Nigerian state, though the Jonathan administration's inability to control it undermines governmental credibility. By contrast, the radical Islamist revolt in the north, commonly called Boko Haram, is a direct threat to the traditional Islamic establishment led by the Sultan of Sokoto and the Shehu of Borno, and to the credibility of the Jonathan government. Boko Haram has tried to murder the Sultan and the Shehu; it also claimed responsibility for killing the Shehu's brother and bodyguards of the Sultan. 1. http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/country/canada_coi/nigeria/N... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 2. http://sunnewsonline.com/new/cover/ombatse-massacr... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 3. http://allafrica.com/stories/2013... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] Religion and Identity Religious conflict is most overt in the Middle Belt, where the religious and ethnic boundaries coincide with disputes over land and water use. Is a victim murdered because he is Hausa, Muslim, or a cattle herder? Or because he is all three? A result has been "ethnic cleansing" reminiscent of the Balkans in the area around the Plateau state capital of Jos in which the Christian and Muslim populations are now segregated. The government in Abuja, the media, and outside observers often label the region's conflicts as "religious," when in fact they are rooted in rivalries over land and water use. Unscrupulous local political figures also sometimes stir-up religious issues to advance a particular agenda. The national and state governments are too weak to suppress the conflicts or to address their underlying causes. Within Nigeria's federal system, not all Nigerians are equal. Nigerian law differentiates between "indigenes" and "settlers." The former, ostensibly "indigenous" to a particular area, enjoy a variety of privileges. "Settlers" come from somewhere else, even if generations ago, as is often the case. They may face social and economic restrictions. It is difficult to overcome "settler" status. In the Middle Belt, "indigenes" tend to be Christian, Barome farmers, while "settlers" are often Muslim, Hausa cattle herders. The "settler" population is perceived to be the more dynamic. It resents its "settler" status, while "indigenes" often feel threatened by "settler" dynamism. The state government is dominated by "indigenes." Religious and ethnic conflict in the Middle Belt is relatively diffuse and disorganised, though the numbers killed can be very high. The government has arrested, prosecuted, tried, convicted, and punished only an insignificant number of perpetrators. In the Middle Belt and elsewhere, ethnic and religious violence in effect has no government-imposed penalty. But, none of these parties seek the destruction of the Nigerian state. Islamic Revival Religious conflict in the North differs in that it is associated with a particular radical Islamic movement called Boko Haram. In the North, Boko Haram (and other, similar organisations) seeks to overthrow the Nigerian state and establish a pure Islamic state organised according to Islamic religious law, called sharia. In the North, there is a multifaceted Islamic revival underway, incorporating elements from Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and Pakistan, as well as Iran. The context is increasing poverty and a general perception of the political marginalisation of the North within the Nigerian federation. The twelve northern states have extended sharia to the criminal domain, but there is widespread dissatisfaction that its harsh penalties apply to the poor man stealing food while the rich man who steals millions through manipulation of government contracts gets off free. A theme of the reformers (non-violent as well as violent) is justice for the poor. General trepidation over encroaching Christianity is widespread in the North. Radical Islamists look to expel the Christian population that is often from other parts of Nigeria. In general, traditional society, not just radical jihadis, discriminates against Christians, and the few Fulani converts to Christianity may be murdered, often by members of their own families. Religious conflict frequently takes the form of a civil war within Islam. Radical reformers, in what is now Nigeria, have long claimed that Muslim leaders are "non-Muslim" if they are "unjust," even when the rulers claim to be Muslims themselves. Hence, "Salafi" reformers pit themselves against "Sufis" who dominate the traditional Nigerian Muslim elites. Some "Salafi" reformers wish to establish a pure Islamic state characterised by the strict application of Sharia. This has potent appeal in a period of increasing personal and communal poverty at the grassroots, while the traditional elites prosper from connections with the federal government and its oil revenue. In the North, there is also an important ethnic dimension. The Fulani ethnic group (in the west) and Kanuri (in the east) both identify themselves as "Sunni" if pushed to apply an internationally understood label. But, Boko Haram is associated more closely with the Kanuri in the northeast. The government and the media usually labels radical jihadis in Fulani areas as Boko Haram, even if they have few direct links with its leader, Abubakar Shekau. As a practical matter, the distinction between "Sunni" and "Shia," so important in other parts of the Muslim world, in Nigeria is largely that the former receive assistance from Saudi Arabia while the latter from Iran. There is, indeed, a small Shia community in the proper sense of the word in Nigeria; the traditional Islamic establishment is hostile to it. An aspect of the Islamist revival has been a rejection of working within the established structures of the secular state. Often charismatic imams (Muslim scholars) or malams (Muslim teachers) organise communities that withdraw as much as possible from secular life. Usually, such groups are quietist, even pacifists. However, at times they can turn violent, usually in response to the secular state's heavy handedness. The emergence of Boko Haram follows this pattern. Key Players and Groups: Boko Haram Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic malam, organised his community at the railroad mosque in Maiduguri around 2003. It sought to establish God's kingdom on earth through the rigid application of sharia and by isolating itself from the secular world. From its inception, the group was hostile to the secular Nigerian state and rejected Western education as non-Islamic. The name they apply to themselves in English means, "the Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad." The more widely known name "Boko Haram" is a label first used by the government and media and comes from their rejection of western education. However, the group was generally non-violent, though not pacifist, until 2009. That year, there was a series of altercations over local issues likely manipulated by local politicians that resulted in Yusuf launching an insurrection against the state. During its suppression, police murdered Yusuf. [4] The crime was captured on film and went viral on social media platforms. Several hundred of his followers were also extra-judicially killed, and the movement went underground, only to re-emerge in 2010 under a new leader, Yusuf's deputy, Abubakar Shekau. Most of Boko Haram's several thousand victims have been Muslims No longer peaceful after Yusuf's death, Boko Haram looked to overthrow through violence the secular Nigerian state and its compromised Islamic establishment. Shekau has called for the replacement of the Sultan of Sokoto–the premier Islamic political and religious leader–by a council dominated by Boko Haram and situated not in Sokoto state but in Yobe state. Illustrating the interplay between religion and ethnicity, Sokoto is Hausa-Fulani in population, while Yobe is Kanuri and traditionally under the authority of the Shehu of Borno, whose authority Boko Haram also rejects. Boko Haram also seeks the expulsion of Christians from the North. However, while it has killed Christians, most of its several thousand victims have been Muslims. The government's response to Boko Haram is to see it as a terrorist movement without popular roots and has reacted with severe repression. The government's seemingly indiscriminate killing of Boko Haram members, and many others simply in the wrong place at the wrong time [5] appears to be a driver of popular support or acquiescence for Boko Haram. During some periods of particularly brutal security force repression, they may be responsible for as many Nigerian deaths as Boko Haram. [6] The government and the media misleadingly attach the label "Boko Haram" to almost any Islamist episode of violence in the north – whether or not it was carried out under the orders from Shekau. "Boko Haram" is a highly diffuse and decentralised grass-roots revolt against the Nigerian political economy. Shekau's Boko Haram makes up only a part. The size of Shekau's Boko Haram is unknown. However, it has mounted operations involving at least five hundred operatives, implying several thousand members and affiliates. In addition, much larger numbers appear to acquiesce to what Boko Haram is doing, even if they do not support its violent methods. A credible hypothesis is that it draws many of its activists from the ranks of former students at the Almijiri schools, decentralised institutions usually without government support, where malams instruct their students to memorise the Qur'an – but teach nothing else. The pool of such students is estimated to number between 10 and 12 million. [7] Others are former prisoners, converted to radical Islam in prison and released through Boko Haram jail breaks. Others still are members of families already in Boko Haram. Very high levels of youth unemployment – estimated at more than fifty percent [8] – also provide a ready pool of recruits. And some operatives have been criminals hired by Boko Haram to participate in specific operations. 4. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2009/07/2009730... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 5. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria1012webw... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 6. http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nige... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 7. http://allafrica.com/stories/2013... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 8. http://allafrica.com/stories/2013... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] Key Players and Groups: Ansaru Ansaru is a smaller radical group with a base in Kano and Kaduna, rather than in Borno or Yobe. Its full name in English means "Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa." Its leadership is obscure; Abu Usama al Answari is frequently identified as its leader but little other than his name is known. Its spokesmen claim the group split from Boko Haram because of the latter's frequent killing of Muslims. Ansaru avoids Muslim casualties and actively attacks Christian churches. It appears to try to provoke a Christian backlash against Muslim minorities in the south, presumably to promote the break-up of the Nigerian state. Thus far, that effort has been unsuccessful. Ansaru has introduced into northern Nigeria tactics more commonly associated with the Sahel, especially kidnapping for ransom and, possibly, the use of suicide bombers, which were previously unknown in West Africa. It is also involved with trans-Saharan smuggling. The group has links with radical Islamist groups in Algeria and Mali, but it is unlikely that it takes direction from them. However, its fighters include some from outside Nigeria, especially Chad and Niger. There is some evidence of tactical cooperation between Ansaru and Boko Haram, and it is possible that they will re-unite. Boko Haram and Ansaru glorify violence. In one of his videos Shekau says, "I enjoy killing anyone that God commands me to kill." [9] Both are bitterly opposed to democracy. Shekau has said, "I swear by Allah that there will be no democracy in Nigeria. We are going to rise against it and we shall soon defeat it. The concept of government of the people, by the people, for the people cannot continue to exist. It shall soon, very soon, be replaced by government of Allah, by Allah, for Allah." [10] President Jonathan has claimed they also destroy symbols of state authority, such as the national flag. [11] Elsewhere in the North are other groups about which outsiders – including the Nigerian government – appear to know little. Their grievances and the focus of their violence are usually local, though they will use the Islamist rhetoric associated with Shekau. Presumably, many of them have a criminal or a political dimension –or both– as opposed to purely religious motivation. 9. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/w... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 10. http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/shekau-appears-in-a-v... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] 11. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/05/read-full-text-of-jonat... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] Wider Aspects of the Conflict Funding for Boko Haram and other radical groups comes from bank robberies, kidnap ransoms, theft of weapons from government armouries, and, especially in the case of criminal groups, from smuggling, including narcotics. Remittances from overseas appear to play no role. None of the groups has moved to set up an alternative state structure, nor do they levy taxes on the local people. It should be noted that terrorism in northern Nigeria is cheap. Explosives – and knowledge about them – are widespread, not least because of the presence of an indigenous mining industry. Automobiles, used for suicide attacks and car bombs, are usually stolen. The large number of weapons in radical hands that come from government armouries implies that radical Islamic groups have infiltrated the military and other institutions of government. Senior military officials and even President Jonathan have affirmed this. Religion in Local Contexts Especially in the North, religious language is commonly used to express grievances which do not necessarily have a religious foundation, but are nonetheless understood through a religious and moral lens. Hence the use of religious vocabulary is an important dimension of conflict that may have a variety of roots. Professor Andrew Kakabase at the UK's Cranford School of Management observes that "in Nigeria, the Christian-Muslim thing is the tip of the iceberg. What's underneath the water is a much more complex sociopolitical situation, which cannot be explained just in terms of the religious divide. You have a recipe ripe for conflict, and it just so happens to be Christian-Muslim." Grievances are commonly seen through a religious and moral lens Throughout Nigeria – not just in the Middle Belt and the North –there is widespread popular anger against those who benefit from the current oil-based political economy. [12] The people are poor – and getting poorer. Yet the country has high rates of economic growth, making the rich richer. The spiritual saturates all aspects of public and private life. Material protests are framed in a spiritual and moral rhetoric, and religious tenets are the foundation for the ideal society. Moreover, the cooperating and competing elites, who have run Nigeria since independence, usurp these deeply embedded religious sentiments for their own purposes. Individuals and groups protesting against those elites equally draw on religious language and sentiments to frame their own rejections of the status quo, and to promote their own vision of Nigeria's future. Hence, in a highly significant way, religion shapes the way Nigerians define the good life – and protest a system that by and large denies it to them. It also provides justification for the use of violence – often murderous – against adversaries who are also defined in religious terms. Hence, Muslims and Christians will kill each other, and Muslims will kill other Muslims, and radical Muslims will murder representatives of the secular government in Abuja—all in the name of establishing God's kingdom on earth and justice for the poor. 12. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/opinion/nigerian-an... [Accessed: 3/2/2014] Porous Borders Northern Nigeria's borders are highly porous and essentially artificial – they were determined by the British and French governments without reference to the local people. Hence people of the same ethnicity and sometimes even the same community live on opposite sides of the border. Islamic movements tend to start in the east, especially Khartoum, and sweep west to Senegal, with national borders being fundamentally disregarded. In this environment, not only is the nation state weak, it is remarkably irrelevant to most people. Nevertheless, jihadist violence in northern Nigeria is overwhelmingly local in its causes and its focus. It is driven by bad governance, failure to promote economic development and the often brutal behavior of the Nigerian security services, especially the military. The West The American and British governments designated Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist organisations in 2013. The U.S. Treasury placed a reward for information on the location of Shekau and a few other radical leaders. The Abuja government seeks to involve Washington and London in its anti-terrorist campaign against Boko Haram. Boko Haram, in turn is using increasingly hostile rhetoric toward the West, especially the United States. Summary • Situation Report • Hide footnotes Author John Campbell Council on Foreign Relations, Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies

ISIS– Largest, Richest $2Billion Terror-Based Enterprise: Financial Sophistication Rivaling Wall Street

ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ) is the world’s largest, richest terrorist organizations, ever. It’s a self-sustaining enterprise that runs mainly on extortion and crime networks, hostages, oil, donations… According to Martin Chulov; ISIS has grown from a ragtag band of extremists to perhaps the most cash-rich and capable terror group in the world with a $2 billion jihadist network. The scale of ISIS resources is unprecedented: A terrorist organization while ruthless, but still able to occupy large areas of territory, quickly… for example; it controls several major cities in Iraq, which it occupied in just three days, it holds parts of several other cities and continues to menace still other cities throughout Iraq and Syria: It’s quite an accomplishment… According to Michael Knights; some estimates of ISIS’s wealth are overstated, for example; the $2 billion estimate that’s been floating around is too high, but that’s not to say ISIS isn’t raking in a fair amount of cash– between $2 million and $4 million per day… ISIS is a wealthy terrorist movement or better yet an effective financial enterprise, which it run very much like a large-scale Mafia type protection rackets business across much of Iraq. http://bizshifts-trends.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/isis-thFE6WPNIS.jpg?2462c9 This group has fashioned a small army out of a mix of foreign and local fighters, established oil refining and trafficking operations, and even collects taxes…. Despite longstanding rumors that ISIS has foreign patrons in Gulf States such as; Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, there is little evidence that it ever depended on foreign largess… While there may be some foreign money flowing to ISIS, stopping these transnational flows will not stymie the group. Whatever its international influences, ISIS raises most of its money from the territories it feeds off of, making the problem of beating back the group exceedingly difficult… According to Howard J. Shatz; ISIS raises much of its money just as a well-organized criminal gang would: It smuggles, it extorts, it skims, it fences, it kidnaps and it shakes down. Although supposedly religiously inspired, its actions are more like those of an organized criminal cult… To quote a U.S. mobster; you don’t get ahead just by being thugs but at some point you must also learn to be a racketeer as well… ISIS’ most important revenue source is the smuggling of oil from the oil fields it controls in Syria and Iraq. It has been reported to control about a dozen oil fields along with several refineries. Estimates of revenue vary, but a range of $1 million to more than $2 million a day is reasonable… ISIS is a formidable fund-raiser. To its disadvantage, the group is also a formidable spender. It pays regular salaries to members based on family size and even has promised to maintain those payments if the member is killed or captured… It also pays rent for some members and medical expenses, maintains safe-houses and buys weapons and other equipment. As cash-based organization, it also has to guard against internal corruption, which is documented in the group’s own records… Historically, ISIS’ main outside revenue has come in small donations from local and foreign supporters… And while donations from the Gulf countries may have been welcome additions, neutralizing donations from wealthy Gulf sources will have little effect on their activities… In the article Who finances ISIS? by Andreas Becker writes: ISIS is recognized as the richest terrorist organization in the world, ever… Iraqi officials estimate that the group now has about $2 billion in its war chest. What remains controversial is where bulk of its money comes from… Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government accuses Saudi Arabia of supporting the ISIS jihadis… According to Charles Lister; there is no publicly accessible proof that governments of any state has been involved in the creation or financing of ISIS as an organisation… Others take a different view. According to Günter Meyer; the most important source of ISIS financing to date has been support coming out of the Gulf states, primarily Saudi Arabia but also Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates… Additional key financing sources are the oil fields of northern Syria: ISIS was able to get the oil fields under their control, where they use trucks to bring oil across the border into Turkey– oil is an important source of funding for them… http://bizshifts-trends.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/untitled.jpg?2462c9 According to Charles Lister; ISIS is largely able to fund itself, and it has established local networks in their occupied territories that generate a continuing flow of money, for example; systematic extortion of small businesses as well as large companies, such as; construction firms… and if the rumors are true, even local government representatives… Also, it levies taxes in the areas that it fully controls… However, one of ISIS’ biggest financial coup so far was the looting of the central bank in Mosul, which brought them equivalent of about $429 million in cash. Additional banks in Mosul and other areas under ISIS control were also plundered… With $429 million, ISIS could pay 60,000 fighters $600 a month for a whole year… Also, ISIS fighters looted much equipment that U.S. left for Iraq military, like; weapons, vehicles… Also, with their financial power, it’s relatively easy for ISIS to buy high-quality weapons on international armaments markets… In the article Iraq Interrogation Reveals ISIS Has $2 Billion in Financing by Cathy Burke writes: The interrogation of a trusted messenger for ISIS, led Iraqi commanders to a treasure trove of information on the terror group and its staggering $2 billion in finances… According to officials; before Mosul, ISIS’ total cash and assets was about $875 million, then afterwards, with the money they robbed from banks and the value of the military supplies they looted, its estimated that they added another $1.5 billion to that… In less than three years, the extremists morphed from a ragtag band of militants into the most cash-rich terror group in the world, and they are accomplishing these feats all by themselves– these are very industrious people… According to some intelligence officials; there are no state actors behind ISIS– they just don’t need one… In the article Who’s Funding ISIS? by Robert Windrem writes: There is a small but steady flow of money to ISIS from rich ‘individuals’ in the Gulf with Qataris being the biggest suppliers, according to some U.S. officials… According to one expert; these rich individuals serve as ‘angel investors’ for the most violent militants, providing ‘seed money’ that helped launch ISIS and other jihadi groups… These rich Arabs are like what ‘angel investors’ are to high-tech start-ups, except they are interested in starting up groups who want to stir up hatred: Groups like al-Nusrah and ISIS are better investments for them. The individuals act as high rollers early, providing seed money. Once the groups are on their feet, they are perfectly capable of raising funds through other means, like; kidnapping, oil smuggling, selling women into slavery… According to intelligence official; any outside funding represents a small fraction of ISIS’s total annual income… The largest source of cash now is oil smuggling along the Turkish border, with ISIS leaders willing to sell oil for as little as $25 a barrel, a quarter of the going world price. Since other previously lucrative sources, such as; kidnapping for ransom… is not as profitable as it once was. http://bizshifts-trends.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/isis-finance.jpg?2462c9 In the article Islamic State: Where Does Jihadist Get Its Support? by Michael Stephens writes: Much has been written about the support Islamic State (ISIS) has received from donors and sympathizers, particularly in the wealthy Gulf States… Indeed the accusation I hear most from those fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria is that Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are solely responsible for the group’s existence. But the truth is more complex and needs exploring… It’s true that some wealthy individuals from the Gulf have funded extremist groups in Syria, many taking bags of cash to Turkey and simply handing over millions of dollars at a time… This was very common practice in 2012 and 2013 but has since diminished and is at most only a tiny percentage of the total income that flows into Islamic State coffers in 2014. Islamic State (ISIS) has put in place what appear to be beginnings of quasi-state structures – ministries, law courts, even a rudimentary taxation system… ISIS has displayed a consistent pattern since it first began to take territory in early 2013… Upon taking control of a town it quickly secures the water, flour and hydrocarbon resources of the area, centralizing distribution and thereby making local population dependent on it for survival… To understand how the Islamic State economy functions is to delve into a murky world of middlemen and shady business dealings, in which ‘loyal ideologues’ on differing sides spot business opportunities and pounce upon them… ISIS exports about 9,000 barrels of oil per day at prices ranging from about $25-$45 (£15-£27): It’s a traditional war economy… The point is that ISIS is essentially self-financing; it cannot be isolated and cut off from the world because it’s intimately tied into regional stability in a way that benefits not only itself, but also the people it controls… In the article Where ISIS Makes Its Money by Tyler Durden writes: ISIS uses oil wealth to help finance its terror operations. Here’s how they do it… According to ‘Iraq Energy Institute'; the army of radical Islamists controls production of 30,000 barrels of oil a day in Iraq and 50,000 barrels in Syria… By selling the oil on the black market at a discounted price of $40 per barrel (compared to about $93/ barrel in free markets), ISIS takes in $3.2 million/day… According to James Phillips; oil revenue gives ISIS a solid economic base that sustains its continued expansion… The oil revenue, which amounts to nearly $100 million/month, allows ISIS to fund its military, terrorist attacks– and attract recruits from around the world… To be successful in counter-terrorism efforts, Phillips said; U.S. and its allies must push the Islamic State out of the oil fields it has captured and disrupt its ability to smuggle the oil to foreign markets… http://bizshifts-trends.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/isis-thU6XKINS5.jpg?2462c9 Here’s how Phillips said the ISIS oil operation works: ISIS sells oil to consumers in territory it controls, roughly the size of Maryland, inside Syria and Iraq. The terrorist group also sells oil to network of smugglers that developed in the 1990s during Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s rule; that network smuggled oil out of Iraq to Turkey to avoid sanctions imposed by the UN. ISIS also reportedly sells oil, through middlemen, to Assad regime… When it comes to making a fast buck, the Middle East has no shortage of ‘strange bedfellows’ willing to do business with each other… The growth of ISIS has been quite incredible: They are armed with– modern weapons, large fighting army, and an effective organization. All of which is bought and paid with real money supplied through a highly sophisticated funding strategy… According to Senator Rubio; ISIS’s criminal activities– robbery, extortion, and trafficking– have helped them become the best funded terrorist group in history. The wealth has helped expand their operational capacity and incentivized both local and foreign fighters to join them… ISIS has the resources, weaponry, and operational safe havens to continue to threaten the stability of the region, as well as; U.S., Europe, other nations’ national security interests… You might like: Rule of Three, Power of Three: It Worked for Thomas Jefferson, Steve Jobs, Julius Caesar, Many Other Gifted Leaders… Try It. Positive Power of Negative Thinking: Great Leaders Build Great Businesses on the Realities of Negative Thinking… Marketing Authorities and Economists Think Differently: How They View– Market Structure Vs. Market Segmentation… The Stupidity Index– Power of Stupid, Idiocy, Lunacy, Folly… Stupidity-Based Theory of Organization and Management

Double Barrel Joy: The Case for Twin-barreled Shotguns

http://blog.remington1816.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/doublebarrel.jpg With a history that dates back more than 150 years, double-barreled shotguns have been popular with sportsmen for a multitude of generations. The reason why they have been augmented, but never replaced, by designs that are more modern, is in their inherent set of advantages that prove to make these guns the primary choice for many today. The history behind the gun Back before the Civil War, double barrel shotguns with exposed hammers, typically with the barrels mounted side-by-side (SXS), were among the most popular sporting guns in the country. In fact, many soldiers in that conflict carried these guns into battle as they provided a super-fast second-shot capability at a time when muzzleloaders of the day took nearly a minute to reload. By the 1870s, the British firm of Anson and Deerley patented a hammerless side-by-side and within a couple decades, guns made with better grades of steel and able to fire modern smokeless powder shells were being marketed. The Remington Model 1894 and later Model 1900 series were among the first hammerless double barrel shotguns made in the U.S. These guns had automatic ejectors, which popped the spent shells out when the hinged action was opened while automatically cocking the internal strikers when the gun’s action closed. Today these classic old guns have been out of production for a century but are still prized by collectors. The double barrel today Besides side-by-sides, the most common and loved double gun today is the over-and-under (OAU or O/U) shotgun with its twin barrels superimposed atop each other. Built with those who flush birds and track their hunting dog’s bloodlines back five generations in mind, these fast-handling scatterguns are made for serious end-users. To these men, a good shotgun is not anachronistic; it is a functional work of art not to be sullied by polymers and sloppiness. Since there is no loading action such as on a pump or semi-automatic to get in the way, these guns can be shorter and lighter than many other sporting shotguns on the market. It’s this ability to be fast to the shoulder and faster on the bead that has allowed double barrels to carve out a niche with clays and upland game shooters who enjoy the feel of finely crafted walnut and steel that is ready at a moment’s notice to go into action. This is particularly true of today’s featherweight 28-gauge guns. Remington marketed O/Us for generations with the Model 32 and its upgraded modernized Model 320 Peerless variant. Commonly found in dove fields and trap stands nationwide, they were only retired in 2005 when the new Premier edition guns were introduced. Its not just Remington that has refused to put these guns out to pasture. Ruger put their Red Label out of the catalog only to bring it back with a redesign this year. Winchester still makes limited runs of their Model 21 and does Browning with their Citori while any number of overseas makers produce new designs that look remarkably vintage. In the end, it seems that the final double barrel is still a long way off from being designed. After all, two centuries of worth of sportsmen testify to their popularity.

CHECKOUT THESE WONDERFUL STORES FOR YOUR HOLIDAY GIFT ITEMS

http://www.zazzle.com/Tobprints?rf=238473622652417938

First Lady Michelle Obama’s Irish slave owner roots

Niall O'Dowd @niallodowd August 13,2014 04:11 AM http://media.irishcentral.com/images/MI+Michelle+Obama+green+getty.jpg Michelle Obama’s original Irish ancestor has been traced and named as Andrew Shields, an Irish immigrant who fought in the American Revolution as a Georgia resident. Andrew Shields was Michelle Obama’s great-great-great-great-great-great-grandfather and his family was slave owners. Michelle Obama’s great-great-great-grandmother Melvinia was a slave who had children by Charles Shields, grandson of Andrew Shields, the Times reveals. One of those children, Dolphus Shields, born in 1859, was Michelle Obama’s direct ancestor. It is not known in Ireland where the Shields came from but it was likely Northern Ireland as the family was Protestant and there was considerable Scots Irish emigration to the American south at the time. This article in The Times is adapted from “American Tapestry: The Story of the Black, White and Multiracial Ancestors of Michelle Obama” by Rachel L. Swarns, a new book due out this week. Swarns used DNA technology to prove the links. The book traces dozens of white relatives of Michelle Obama, none of whom knew of their connection through slavery to the First Lady. Most were shocked to learn the connection and hoped that the Shields-Melvinia relationship was not one of rape and coercion but love. "You really don’t like to face this kind of thing,” said Mrs. Joan Tribble, whose ancestors owned the First Lady’s great-great-great-grandmother. “To me, it’s an obvious love story that was hard for the South to accept back then,” said Aliene Shields, a descendant who now lives in South Carolina, pointing to the fact that they had several children together. Melvinia was just 15 when she gave birth to Dolphus in 1859. She was an illiterate woman who was confined to work in the fields by the Shields family. The Times first reported the Irish link to Michelle in 2009. Megan Smolenyak, the same genealogist who discovered that President Obama’s Irish roots go back to Moneygall in County Offaly, has discovered that Michelle Obama's family tree has a large Irish branch. Smolenyak traced Michelle's heritage back to the young slave girl Melvinia Shields, who was once traded for $475. Melvinia became the property of Henry Shields in 1852. Smolenyak said the young girl still haunted her. "It's still jarring to see dollar signs associated with human beings," she said. Michelle's Irish roots were one of the major findings in Smolenyak's research. Smolenyak spent nine months researching the First Lady's family tree in conjunction with The New York Times. Smolenyak began the project just before Obama was named president and she said she hoped that her discovery will please the First Lady. "The vast majority of people are happy when their heritage is just kind of handed to them," she said. "She's got a really rich ancestry. This would be my fantasy: that she's clicking [on the Web site] through all the branches of her family tree, sitting there with Sasha and Malia and Marian Robinson, and I hope they're pleased." In 2007, Smolenyak found out where in Ireland Obama’s family came from after tracing Obama’s third great-grandfather on his mother’s side, Fulmoth Kearney, who journeyed from Moneygall in County Offaly to the U.S. Originally published in 2012.

CHECK OUT THIS WONDERFUL STORES FOR YOU CHRISTMAS GIFTS

http://www.zazzle.com/Tobprints?rf=238473622652417938

Man gets 110-year term for rape of girl, death of 6-year-old brother who came to her defense

Published December 04, 2014 Associated Press Facebook17 Twitter8 Email Print CAMDEN, N.J. – A New Jersey man was sentenced Thursday to 110 years in prison in the rape of a girl and the stabbing death of her 6-year-old brother who had come to her defense. Thirty-five-year-old Osvaldo Rivera was sentenced for the 2012 crimes authorities say he committed after smoking "wet," or marijuana laced with PCP. A few weeks before the attacks, a Camden woman who had been using the same drug decapitated her 2-year-old son then killed herself. The two tragedies brought attention to the dangers of the drug and to a rash of homicides that year in Camden. Authorities say Rivera broke into the family's home early morning Sept. 2, 2012, and attacked the girl who was asleep on the sofa. Family members have said that 6-year-old Dominick Andujar was stabbed when he came to his sister's defense. "Grown men wouldn't do what Dominick did that day," Tiarra Andujar, another of Dominick's sisters, told reporters outside the courthouse Thursday. "He's our soldier and will forever be in our hearts until the day we die." Rivera was convicted in July of murder, attempted murder, aggravated sexual assault, burglary and terroristic threats. The girl, now 14 and still bearing scars where she was slashed with a knife that morning, attended the sentencing. Family members wept in court as more than a dozen people read statements about the harm Rivera did, The Courier-Post (http://on.cpsj.com/1vSj1FA) reported. ___ Information from: Courier-Post (Cherry Hill, N.J.), http://www.courierpostonline.com/

'I would kill you': ISIS captive held by Kurds admits taking 70 lives

Kurds in northern Iraq are holding hundreds of ISIS fighters prisoner, including one who told FoxNews.com in an exclusive interview that he killed as many as 70 people in the service of the radical jihadist army. “Omar, “ a 25-year-old former Islamic State fighter from the Iraqi village of Dor sal-hadeen, said he killed scores of his countrymen and foreign contractors after joining “Daesh,” as ISIS is known in the region, in June. He said he fled the terrorist army in October, but was quickly captured by Kurdish security forces. “They came to our area and forced me to protect their lands,” Omar said of his Islamic State commanders. “After a while they told me, ‘When are you going to start protecting your own land?’ “They told me to do it or die, and then they killed people in front of me,” said Omar, who is missing four fingers on his left hand from what he said was a 2009 industrial accident. The disability nearly got him killed by his ISIS handlers, he said, until he proved he could shoot right-handed. Omar is currently being held in an undisclosed prison in Sulymaniyah, after being convicted of terrorism. He was initially sentenced to death, but a judge commuted the sentence to life in prison. Face to face with ISIS FoxNews.com's Hollie McKay last month traveled to Kurdish-administered territory in Iraq's Sulymaniyah province, where she met face-to-face with two imprisoned ex-Islamic State soldiers. The interviews were conducted over the course of several hours, and took place in an office at Sulymaniyah’s “Asaih,” or security facility, in the presence of a Kurdish colonel and an independent Kurdish translator. No questions were off-limits for the prisoners, who appeared in civilian clothes, and were not handcuffed or shackled. Asaish officials provided mug shots of the men, but as a condition of the interview insisted FoxNews.com not use their full names. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sipping the tea provided by his Kurdish captors during the FoxNews.com interview, Omar insisted he was an ISIS victim – and even pledged to join the fight against them. But victim or not, Omar said he became a prolific killer for ISIS, by his count racking up 70 executions in a matter of months. He claimed he killed his victims with rifle shots, and was chillingly candid about why he did it. “Because they were saying bad words about A'isha [one of Mohammad’s wives, known as the “mother of believers”] and burning a mosque,” he said, adding that he did not receive any type of reward from ISIS leaders for the large number he killed. Asked if he felt remorse, Omar replied said he “did not act on my own will.” That claim drew a sharp rebuke from the commander of the facility's department of investigation, prompting Omar to say he deflected blame because he was uncomfortable around women. Omar and other hundreds of other former ISIS soldiers and deserters are being interrogated for intelligence that may help the Kurdish Peshmerga army in its fight against the jihadist group. Kurdish officials say the men are being held under conditions in adherence to international law and monitored by the Red Cross. Evidence against individual former combatants is gathered and presented to a Kurdish judge, who decides whether prisoners are held or released, according to the Kurdish commander who sat in the interview, and did not allow his name to be used. Omar and many other ex-ISIS fighters convicted of mass murder or terrorism charges may well spend the rest of their lives in prison. Other ex-ISIS fighters judged to be non-terrorists will serve lesser sentences, or will be released among the general population. At another point in the interview, Omar said he joined ISIS to get away from his new bride. Saying she had “something in her head – she looked normal on the outside, but she wasn’t,” Omar added that his wife “couldn’t have babies.” He then acknowledged, with a shrug, that by fleeing to join the murderous jihadi army he left his family responsible for paying his wife’s family a fortune. “I would call you to Islam and if you did not come I would kill you.” - "Omar," ISIS fighter held by Kurds Omar said he deserted ISIS and fled to Kurdistan in an attempt to blend in and find work, but was arrested by police on Oct. 8, after being identified by Kurdish intelligence agents. Although he said at times that he wished to take up arms with the Iraqi military or the Kurds, there were several instances in which Omar used the pronoun for “we” when discussing Daesh, a possible giveaway of his true sentiments toward non-believers in general, and Americans in particular. “We count Americans like Jews,” he said at one point in the interview. He had similarly hostile views of Western women. Asked what he would do if he saw his female interviewer on the street, he replied, “I would call you to Islam and if you didn’t, I would leave you alone.” Pressed, he corrected himself. “I would call you to Islam and if you did not come, I would kill you.” Omar was one of two former Islamic State fighters who spoke to FoxNews.com at the Asaish facility, where terrorists are held with local criminals. The other, a 19-year-old Kurd identified as "Dawen," said he was lured to join by the group’s Facebook pages, which urged Muslims to come fight in Syria. Dawen said he spent just 20 days in the world’s most infamous terrorist army before being arrested two months ago. He said he did not witness any killings, but had no illusions about Islamic State’s barbarity. “I realized that this is not about God, especially after I was captured,” he said. “I realize this isn’t about God; it is about harming people. Also, the Kurdish people were nice even with my situation.” Dawen said he felt regret about joining the group almost immediately. “I called my family and they were not happy, it was shameful… I felt weak because they made me act and think a certain way,” he said, when asked whether joining a terrorist organization made him feel powerful. “I was asking for forgiveness, even while there.” Dawen, who faces terrorism charges, also insisted he is learning more from fellow inmates about other barbarities committed by ISIS, and suggested Kurdish officials “make anti-terror shows and programs” to teach others that this is “not the way to be.” The facility's director of security said most ISIS fighters are uneducated, and easily led down the bloody path of violent jihad. “Some regret their actions, some do not,” he said. “Understand that most are young and have no information. They are impressionable. They listen to the second-life paradise story, 72 virgins, rivers of wine, and [staying] young forever. That is all they know.” Unlike prisoners of ISIS, many of whom have been marched into the desert and executed, or garbed in orange jumpsuits and forced to kneel before being beheaded, deserters and captives from the terrorist army say they are treated well by Kurdish authorities. The two men interviewed by FoxNews.com were dressed comfortably, clean-shaven, appeared well-nourished and showed no signs of physical injury or abuse. Hundreds of ISIS fighters captured in battle or after deserting are held in prisons in the Kurdish stronghold of Sulaymaniyah. (Wikipedia) Both men confirmed they are allowed phone contact with family members, and seemed aware of recent news events involving ISIS. Both said they feared being captured by ISIS if released. Security officers, however, cautioned against believing the prisoners’ expressions of remorse. Both men told FoxNews.com they wanted to join the Peshmerga, the Kurdish army that has won back much of the Iraqi and Syrian land seized by ISIS. But Kurdish officials said neither man could be trusted, noting ISIS has been known to send spies into Kurdistan. Kurdish officials privately predicted there was little doubt the two men, and others like them, would be back fighting for ISIS within days if they were ever freed. Referring to former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s repeated and destructive campaigns against the Kurds, the official noted they have extensive experience handling such threats. “We have been dealing with terrorist groups since the beginning, so this is not new for us. We specialize in terrorists.” Mylee Cardenas contributed to this report

Yes, secular Jews are Jewish too

Home blogs France24 Israel Post Notes on a country straddling between reality and utopia Mon, 01/02/2012 - 17:36 Yes, secular Jews are Jewish too 5 You should be ashamed. That’s all I have to say to the hundreds of ultra-Orthodox Jews who protested in Jerusalem’s Sabbath Square on Saturday night. Some of the demonstrators wore yellow Star of David badges; others dressed in concentration camp-like uniforms to symbolize the Nazi regime’s prosecution of Jews during World War II. Their point: to say that the secular majority has made them the scapegoats of everything wrong in Israel and that the country incriminates their “Jewish” way of life. Like most Israelis whom for years have put up with the lack of public transportation on Saturdays, the barricaded streets on Shabbat, and the ridiculous teachings in state schools, I’d usually turn a blind eye and nod to their nonsense. This time, however, they’ve crossed a dangerous line. You see that’s the issue when a country’s entire national identity is tied to the Holocaust. When you invoke that weapon, it could quickly turn into a double-edged sword. This morning, everyone from Defence Minister Ehud Barak to Opposition Leader Tzipi Livni, expressed the outrage that echoed across Israeli dailies and social networks. Enough is enough. This isn’t an argument about a religious versus a secular way of life. Spitting on a seven-year-old girl in Beit Shemesh constitutes as harassment and the individuals who are propagating these kinds of behavior are going to face the law. Defending them, by invoking the false analogy of the Shoah is scandalous and offensive. Unfortunately, Israeli politicians slapping the Haredi community on the wrists and telling them that they are doing “bad, bad, things” is not going to cut it. This is a wake up call for them too. For far too long your arms have been twisted to believe in the narrow logic of a Jewish democracy, leaving you to build “consensus” with extreme religious groups. You have attempted to appease them but each and every time you give another piece of an ever so brittle democracy. Daniel Hartman expresses this malaise in his blog: “The failure of the remaining 80 percent of Israeli society lies in the fact that it has not of late produced sufficient heroes of its own with a vision of the values necessary to create a liberal Jewish democracy, as well as the values which give primacy to the people over land, and to the State over tribal ideologies and loyalties. When encountering the ideological heroism and agenda of the settlers and the ultra-Orthodox, most of Israel capitulates. "The fault is not in the political system but in a combination of ideological weakness, a lack of comprehensive values agenda, and a deficiency in heroism when it comes to internal Israeli policy. This has created a lethal cocktail for the future of Israeli society, a cocktail which seems to have anesthetized much of Israel into acquiescing to demands made by those who seem to care more about the issues than they do. "But the problem is even more severe. The timidity of the majority of Israel is enabling the heroism of the settlers and the ultra-Orthodox to morph into fanaticism. When one is not challenged nor forced to confront the limits of one’s own arguments, there will always be some who interpret this as license to cross the line”. Indeed, the problem is even more severe. However, it has to do with the notion that a liberal Jewish democracy can exist. By definition, a modern Jewish state that advocates for the rights of a particular group of people that is defined a “raced religion” (read: Jews) is a twenty-first-century theocracy. Let’s not forget that the majority of European Jews before World War II were not members of ultra-Orthodox Hardi communities as we’ve come to know them today. They were traditionalists. They kept the Sabbath, lived in shtetls, married other Jews but were not Haredim. In Germany, France and the U.S., many were secular. The Haredi movement of the late 1800s was a complete knee-jerk reaction to modernity and to European nationalism. Herzl and the first waves of Zionists just created their own version. The problem with today’s Haredi movement is more of the same. They have co-opted history to blame all non-ultra Orthodox and secular Jews and say, “you see, that is why they killed us during the Holocaust. Had you honored your faith, we would have survived”. When in reality, all Jews were victims of the most extreme form of nationalism. And today it seems that we too have become victims of the same Nazi logic. This time, we’re doing it to ourselves. Instead of owning up to this truth, we prefer to expound the logic of Nazis themselves with a twist, propagating the “Jewish homeland”. We build settlements, openly discriminate non-Jewish communities because “they have a nation-state somewhere in the world”, and now even watch as a young girl is openly harassed. This ideology is so extreme, even us poor secular folk will parish in the Gehenom concentration camp. Romina Ruiz-Goiriena Paris Charles de Gaulle airport en route to Guatemala by way of Mexico City

Avoiding the Turkey mistake

Home blogs France24 Israel Post Notes on a country straddling between reality and utopia Wed, 08/24/2011 - 11:32 Avoiding the Turkey mistake The way that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reacts to the Sinai crisis will inevitably set the roadmap for the kind of relationship the country will have with the future Egyptian government. And from what it seems, the decision to refrain from a military operation in Gaza and not plunge into a diplomatic duel with Egypt is a step in that direction. The attack in Eilat last Thursday, dually attempted to subvert Israel’s shaky relationship with a post-Mubarak Egypt and to defy the appearance that Hamas holds full control over the Gaza Strip. The radical organisations responsible banked on an Israeli retaliation that would put an unequivocal end to the ceasefire. Succumbing to newfound domestic pressure over the deaths of Egyptian policemen, Egypt had no option but to recall its ambassador. Whilst it is true that the two countries enjoyed a long-standing history of pragmatic security cooperation (greatly because of U.S. interests), both parties enjoyed this honeymoon under ousted President Hosni Mubarak. The former Egyptian leader received bountiful aid from the United States to protect the border and at the same time treated the Bedouin-run Sinai as enemy territory often inundating the region with police officers to enforce Israel’s Gaza blockade. It is also safe to say that the poor treatment of Bedouin communities on the part of both Israel and Mubarak are responsible for the security issues in the border today.The neglect of these communities laid the groundwork for cooperation between some Bedouins and radical organisations that have spun out of Hamas’s control. These organisations pay Bedouins to smuggle weapons, drugs, people or even assist in attacks. In a post-Mubarak Egypt the area has become a free for all, with a paper-thin Egyptian government struggling with political and economic capital to secure the area. However, they also know that failure to proactively and peacefully share a border with Israel is a threat to their national security and sovereignty. As ZviBar’el put it in his op-ed in Haaretz Saturday, “it is interesting that the government’s message included a commitment to organise a special authority to deal with the Bedouins. It is clear that the government understands its failure to secure the area, a form of neglect, which now threatens Egypt’s national security and its relations with Israel”. However, Israel’s stake in the crisis is higher and failing to cooperate with Egypt—let alone letting it exercise its authority—could be extremely costly. That includes, failing to apologise like it did with Turkey. (AFP) Israel refused to issue a formal apology after the flotilla takeover in May 2010 that resulted in the deaths of eight Turks and one American. Ankara declared then that recovery of relations depended solely on this apology. Only yesterday, Today’s Zaman reported Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu warned while on a trip to South Africa relations would only “worsen if an apology was not forthcoming following the release of the Palmer report. He declared, relations will not remain as they are now. They will deteriorate even more, as the current situation cannot be sustained”. Perhaps, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Ehud Barak believed then it was an ally they could live without. But it was a different world back then, the Arab Spring had not taken off in full force changing the political map of the Middle East and North Africa. Given the amount of change and instability no one knows for sure what the region will look like tomorrow let alone twenty years from now. Kimberly Gouz, former Turkey Fulbright Scholar and current PhD candidate in Government at the University of Texas, agrees that Israel has more to lose than Egypt if this diplomatic tiff is not brushed-off speedily. “In an environment where Israel’s once unbreakable relationship with the US has begun to cool and its very strong relationship with Turkey has greatly deteriorated, it is not in Israel’s interest to embitter its relationship with yet another strong ally”. Israel is asking itself many existential questions that may very well define the kind of global player it will be as change continues to sweep the volatile region. How it chooses to engage with Egypt will determine if isolation is the name of the game uselessly fighting the problem alone; or whether it will tackle a security issue bilaterally once and for all, proving that just maybe they too can change. Romina Ruiz-Goiriena Paris