Until May 23, Niger, a desperately poor, landlocked country of 17
million that shares long borders with volatile states including Mali,
Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, had been spared from the violence that has
plagued its neighbors over the past two years. But when Islamist
militants launched simultaneous attacks in the country’s north, killing
26 and injuring dozens more, Niger suddenly found itself fighting
battles at home that it had hoped others would fight abroad
Though much has been made of Niger’s recent ascendance as a key U.S.
ally in the Sahel region, the country had already begun to distinguish
itself as a useful counterterrorism ally in Department of Defense
circles as early as 2006. However, political issues, namely a
constitutional crisis in 2009 and a military coup in 2010, complicated
the relationship. Once elections were held and Niger’s democracy was
restored in 2011, the U.S. was eager to “re-normalize” relations and
expand cooperation.
Further impetus to deepen security ties was
added by the fall of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi in 2011—which drove
an estimated 200,000 Nigeriens living in Libya, many of whom were armed
fighters, back to Niger—as well as the
ensuing collapse of Mali in 2012.
The
U.S. and Niger signed a status of forces agreement, which had been in
the works since 2007, in January 2013, after which U.S. military
activities in the country significantly increased.
In February,
President Barack Obama announced the U.S. would be sending about 100
troops to Niger. Their mission, according to a U.S. Africa Command
representative reached by email, is to provide support “for intelligence
collection and facilitate intelligence sharing with French forces
conducting operations in Mali.”
However, one U.S. government
official, speaking on condition of anonymity, suggested the number of
U.S. military personnel, some of whom might be contractors, is “almost
certainly” higher than 100. Several sources, including Nigeriens and
outside analysts in Niger, described the U.S. military presence as
“palpable,” “very visible” and “obvious.” In February, the U.S. also
began flying an unspecified number of unarmed Predator drones out of the
national airport in the capital, Niamey.
U.S. officials stress
that the increased U.S. presence in Niger includes nonmilitary
personnel. Since 2006, the U.S. has taken an interagency approach to
development and counterterrorism in the country, a State Department-led
effort that also includes the U.S. Agency for International Development
and the Department of Justice. Additionally, when the U.S. downsized its
programs in Mali during the height of the post-coup instability in
2012, the U.S. mission in Niger absorbed various programs and personnel
from that mission.
France, which considers its former colonies
in West Africa and the Sahel to be its backyard, is wary of the
increased U.S. presence in Niger. Though most analysts say that France
and the U.S. are not divided on Niger just yet, disagreements between
the two are becoming more frequent, and the relationship will likely
become more tense if the U.S. augments its counterterrorism activities
in country.
Several sources told WPR that the key areas of
tension stem from deep-rooted differences in how the two countries’
respective intelligence agencies deal with threats emanating from places
like Niger. “The U.S. [intelligence] guys always want to eliminate the
problem,” said one analyst who has spent years in the region. “The
French,” he continued, “prefer to manage the problem, without all the
raids and airstrikes and things like that. So we are talking about two
completely different mentalities.”
Some of these disagreements
stem from a widespread belief within French policymaking and
intelligence circles that the Americans will never understand Africa
with the supposed expertise and nuance that France does. “Dealing with
problems in the Sahel and the Sahara is nothing new for the French,”
said a French analyst who asked not to be named. “There is nothing
unprecedented about what the French are doing there.”
“France
has always been confident in its ability to protect its interests in
Niger,” said a European diplomat speaking on condition of anonymity.
“During the height of the Tuareg rebellion in 2007 and 2009,” he
continued, “France managed to extract uranium from Niger without major
disruption.” It did so by striking “a delicate balance” between buying
protection from local interests and maintaining good relations with the
Nigerien government.
But with new economic and security players
emerging, maintaining that “delicate balance” is becoming increasingly
complicated. Since 2007, China has emerged as a significant player in
Niger’s uranium and oil sectors. The increased U.S. presence adds yet
another layer of complexity to an already challenging equation. French
policymakers fear that as the Americans insert themselves into Niger’s
delicate security ecosystem, they will unwittingly do more harm than
good and put French assets at risk.
U.S. policymakers insist
that the U.S. is maintaining a light footprint in the Sahel. But while
U.S. expenditures there pale in comparison to what Washington pours into
other regions, they still dwarf the amounts that France can commit. In
places like Niger, the U.S. can spend what it considers to be a small
amount of money and still quickly get a seat at any table. The French
fear that decades’ worth of engagement and cultivating relationships in
Niger could be suddenly undermined by a chase for American dollars,
leaving France’s interests exposed.
While the U.S. and France
have a shared interest in stability in Niger, France would prefer to
maintain its status as Niamey’s privileged security partner because,
unlike the U.S., the French pursuit of regional stability in the Sahel
is motivated by long-term economic interests and national security
concerns. America’s long-term aspirations are considerably less clear,
and while recent events have raised the Sahel’s profile in Washington
policymaking circles, it still remains a low priority at the highest
levels.
In spite of these concerns, France is still eager to
cooperate with the Americans when it comes to intelligence sharing, and
views their comparative strengths as complementary. The U.S., for
example, has considerable capabilities for gathering information through
surveillance, but almost no ability to translate this information into
actionable intelligence on the ground. For its part, France has spent
decades developing human intelligence sources in the region, but lacks
high-tech surveillance capabilities. The prevailing French attitude, as
one French analyst told WPR, is “please give us your money and your
intel, because we are the ones who actually know what to do with it.”
In
many ways, these frictions highlight the precarious position in which
the U.S. and France find themselves as they try to engage threats
emanating from Niger as well as the broader Sahel. The security dynamics
throughout the region are fluid, and while both Washington and Paris
agree that regional stability ought to be the goal, there remains wide
disagreement between them, as well as among states within the region, on
what “stability” means and how best to achieve it. Absent a consensus
on these issues, however, the quest for stability could have
destabilizing effects.
the
ovary (ovulation). While developing, the cells around the egg produce
the hormone oestrogen. After ovulation these cells produce a second
hormone, progesterone. Together the two hormones stimulate the lining of
the uterus (womb) to grow. The ovulated egg enters the fallopian tube
and travels towards the womb. If intercourse has taken place and no
contraception has been used, the sperm may fertilise the egg while it is
in the tube. The resulting embryo will implant into the lining of the
womb where it develops into a baby.
