As Security Focus on Niger Grows, U.S.-France Tensions Brew:

Until May 23, Niger, a desperately poor, landlocked country of 17 million that shares long borders with volatile states including Mali, Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, had been spared from the violence that has plagued its neighbors over the past two years. But when Islamist militants launched simultaneous attacks in the country’s north, killing 26 and injuring dozens more, Niger suddenly found itself fighting battles at home that it had hoped others would fight abroad
Though much has been made of Niger’s recent ascendance as a key U.S. ally in the Sahel region, the country had already begun to distinguish itself as a useful counterterrorism ally in Department of Defense circles as early as 2006. However, political issues, namely a constitutional crisis in 2009 and a military coup in 2010, complicated the relationship. Once elections were held and Niger’s democracy was restored in 2011, the U.S. was eager to “re-normalize” relations and expand cooperation.

Further impetus to deepen security ties was added by the fall of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi in 2011—which drove an estimated 200,000 Nigeriens living in Libya, many of whom were armed fighters, back to Niger—as well as the ensuing collapse of Mali in 2012.

The U.S. and Niger signed a status of forces agreement, which had been in the works since 2007, in January 2013, after which U.S. military activities in the country significantly increased.

In February, President Barack Obama announced the U.S. would be sending about 100 troops to Niger. Their mission, according to a U.S. Africa Command representative reached by email, is to provide support “for intelligence collection and facilitate intelligence sharing with French forces conducting operations in Mali.”

However, one U.S. government official, speaking on condition of anonymity, suggested the number of U.S. military personnel, some of whom might be contractors, is “almost certainly” higher than 100. Several sources, including Nigeriens and outside analysts in Niger, described the U.S. military presence as “palpable,” “very visible” and “obvious.” In February, the U.S. also began flying an unspecified number of unarmed Predator drones out of the national airport in the capital, Niamey.

U.S. officials stress that the increased U.S. presence in Niger includes nonmilitary personnel. Since 2006, the U.S. has taken an interagency approach to development and counterterrorism in the country, a State Department-led effort that also includes the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of Justice. Additionally, when the U.S. downsized its programs in Mali during the height of the post-coup instability in 2012, the U.S. mission in Niger absorbed various programs and personnel from that mission.

France, which considers its former colonies in West Africa and the Sahel to be its backyard, is wary of the increased U.S. presence in Niger. Though most analysts say that France and the U.S. are not divided on Niger just yet, disagreements between the two are becoming more frequent, and the relationship will likely become more tense if the U.S. augments its counterterrorism activities in country.

Several sources told WPR that the key areas of tension stem from deep-rooted differences in how the two countries’ respective intelligence agencies deal with threats emanating from places like Niger. “The U.S. [intelligence] guys always want to eliminate the problem,” said one analyst who has spent years in the region. “The French,” he continued, “prefer to manage the problem, without all the raids and airstrikes and things like that. So we are talking about two completely different mentalities.”

Some of these disagreements stem from a widespread belief within French policymaking and intelligence circles that the Americans will never understand Africa with the supposed expertise and nuance that France does. “Dealing with problems in the Sahel and the Sahara is nothing new for the French,” said a French analyst who asked not to be named. “There is nothing unprecedented about what the French are doing there.”

“France has always been confident in its ability to protect its interests in Niger,” said a European diplomat speaking on condition of anonymity. “During the height of the Tuareg rebellion in 2007 and 2009,” he continued, “France managed to extract uranium from Niger without major disruption.” It did so by striking “a delicate balance” between buying protection from local interests and maintaining good relations with the Nigerien government.

But with new economic and security players emerging, maintaining that “delicate balance” is becoming increasingly complicated. Since 2007, China has emerged as a significant player in Niger’s uranium and oil sectors. The increased U.S. presence adds yet another layer of complexity to an already challenging equation. French policymakers fear that as the Americans insert themselves into Niger’s delicate security ecosystem, they will unwittingly do more harm than good and put French assets at risk.

U.S. policymakers insist that the U.S. is maintaining a light footprint in the Sahel. But while U.S. expenditures there pale in comparison to what Washington pours into other regions, they still dwarf the amounts that France can commit. In places like Niger, the U.S. can spend what it considers to be a small amount of money and still quickly get a seat at any table. The French fear that decades’ worth of engagement and cultivating relationships in Niger could be suddenly undermined by a chase for American dollars, leaving France’s interests exposed.

While the U.S. and France have a shared interest in stability in Niger, France would prefer to maintain its status as Niamey’s privileged security partner because, unlike the U.S., the French pursuit of regional stability in the Sahel is motivated by long-term economic interests and national security concerns. America’s long-term aspirations are considerably less clear, and while recent events have raised the Sahel’s profile in Washington policymaking circles, it still remains a low priority at the highest levels.

In spite of these concerns, France is still eager to cooperate with the Americans when it comes to intelligence sharing, and views their comparative strengths as complementary. The U.S., for example, has considerable capabilities for gathering information through surveillance, but almost no ability to translate this information into actionable intelligence on the ground. For its part, France has spent decades developing human intelligence sources in the region, but lacks high-tech surveillance capabilities. The prevailing French attitude, as one French analyst told WPR, is “please give us your money and your intel, because we are the ones who actually know what to do with it.”

In many ways, these frictions highlight the precarious position in which the U.S. and France find themselves as they try to engage threats emanating from Niger as well as the broader Sahel. The security dynamics throughout the region are fluid, and while both Washington and Paris agree that regional stability ought to be the goal, there remains wide disagreement between them, as well as among states within the region, on what “stability” means and how best to achieve it. Absent a consensus on these issues, however, the quest for stability could have destabilizing effects.